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abstr act
This paper explores the role of examples (paradeigmata) as propaedeutic to 
 philosophical inquiry, in light of a methodological digression in Plato’s Statesman. 
Consistent with scholarship on Aristotle’s view of example, scholars of Plato’s work 
have privileged the logic of examples over their rhetorical appeal. Following a small 
but significant trend in recent rhetorical scholarship that emphasizes the affective 
nature of examples, this article assesses the psychagogic potential of paradeigmata, 
following the discussion of example in Plato’s Statesman. I argue that by creating 
an expectation in the learner that he or she will find similarities, the use of exam-
ples in philosophical pedagogy engages his or her desire to discern the intelligible 
 principles that ground experiential knowledge. Thus, examples not only serve as 
practice at the dialectician’s method of abstraction but also cultivate a dialectical 
ēthos, characterized by the desire to know the logoi of all things.
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introduction
Ever since Gerard Hauser’s 1968 article “The Example in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: 
Bifurcation or Contradiction?” drew attention to the difficulty of interpret-
ing Aristotle’s asymmetrical descriptions of example (paradeigma), rhetorical 
theorists have engaged in a significant and broad discussion regarding the 
proper understanding of the role of examples in argumentation and inquiry. 
Originally, the scholarly discussion concerned what precisely Aristotle 
means  by suggesting that examples proceed from “part to part” (1932, 14 
[1357b28-29])—that is, whether he is asserting that they operate by means of a 
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“mediating  generalization” (Benoit 1987, 261) or, instead, by what Hauser calls 
an “unmediated inference” (1968, 88). Although Hauser recognizes that argu-
ment through example makes a logical appeal to an abstract rule, he empha-
sizes the audience’s experience, asserting that the move from “part to part” is 
an immediate inference made by the listener, who recognizes the similari-
ties among cases without thematizing the general principle. Focusing on the 
effect of rhetorical speech upon the “whole person” (Grimaldi 1958), Hauser 
argues that Aristotle sees the rhetoric of example as involving psychological 
and affective elements that operate independent of inductive reasoning.
By emphasizing the perspective of the audience and the process of rea-
soning over that of the speaker and the static logic of a completed argu-
ment, Hauser’s reading marked a significant departure from the orthodoxy 
of analytical assessments of argument by example. This dominant view 
is well represented in the standard manual of rhetorical argumentation, 
The New Rhetoric: “There is a tendency to lead the hearer from the example 
to a particular conclusion, without any rule being stated. This is termed 
arguing from the particular to the particular. . . . The notions used in describ-
ing the particular instance that serves as example implicitly operate as the 
rule enabling the passage from one instance to another” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 352). Note that the movement of thought in the 
listener is reduced to an implicit replication of the rhetor’s own argument, 
such that the listener’s motivation appears insignificant.
Other scholars have stressed the psychological and affective aspects of 
the rhetoric of example, applying this consideration to a variety of literary 
traditions (Consigny 1976; Arthos 2003; McCormick 2008; Stroud 2011). 
Clearly, interpretations of example are no longer limited to discussion of its 
relation to the logic of induction, and many interpreters agree that “there 
can be no separation of logic and psychology” (Arthos 2003, 338). In what 
follows, I too seek to assess the affective ground of reasoning by example, 
looking to the explicit methodological treatment of paradeigma as a peda-
gogical tool in Plato’s Statesman.
The Statesman’s main interlocutor, the Eleatic Stranger, introduces an 
extended discussion of example saying, “It is difficult to grasp the greater 
things without the use of paradeigmata” (Plato 1925, 77 [277d1–3]).1 The 
Stranger thus emphasizes that examples are not simply a method of argu-
ment and exposition but, as Richard Robinson puts it, a “method of discov-
ery” (1962, 211) whereby someone acquires new understanding based on the 
similarity of a novel case to a familiar one. While current scholarship on the 
dialogues offers substantial consideration of the logical strength of Socrates’ 
invocation of examples (the debate regarding the “Socratic fallacy”) as well 
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as interpretations of the relationship between the Statesman’s discussion 
of examples and the dialectician’s method of collection, scholars have pro-
vided no pedagogical account of the means by which a learner ascends from 
recognizing the similarity among cases (the example) to knowledge of the 
principle that grounds that similarity (the exemplarity of an example).2
To provide such an account, this paper studies what I term the “psycha-
gogic” work of examples—whereby the desire to find similarities draws a 
soul toward concern for the intelligible. I take this term from Socrates’ dis-
cussion of rhetoric in the Phaedrus: “Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art 
which leads the soul (technē psychagōgia) by means of words?” (1914, 517–18 
[261a10]). In this passage, Socrates is critiquing sophistical psychagōgia, which 
exploits similarities in order to move the beliefs of the listener steadily from 
one position to its opposite. However, Socrates subsequently asserts that 
true psychagogy requires one to know the nature of things, so a genuine 
rhetorician would of necessity practice the dialectician’s “divine” methods 
of collection and division (1914, 525, 535 [263b7–9, 265d2–e4]). This seems to 
imply that a philosophical rhetoric and psychagogy employs  similarities to 
reveal the truth, moving the soul not from opposites to  opposites but from 
what is similar to the truth toward the truth itself.
In my study of the Statesman, then, I seek to reveal the philosophical 
psychagogy involved in the pedagogical deployment of example. I contend 
that by offering an example, a teacher directs a student’s attention toward 
seeking out similarities, offering practice at conceptual abstraction. By 
inculcating a desire for finding the principle behind the similarity between 
familiar and unfamiliar cases, the pedagogical deployment of examples is 
one method for leading a soul (psychē-agōgē) to seek the intelligible residing 
within experience. I conclude, then, that in addition to their logical func-
tion examples play an important psychagogic role in inquiry, a view that, 
while more common among rhetorical theorists, has been largely neglected 
by interpreters of the dialogues. If this account is successful, it contributes 
to a deeper appreciation of the significance of the pedagogical context of 
the Statesman’s discussion of examples, and it supports a deeper under-
standing of the affective basis for the rhetoric of example.
scholarship on example in plato’s work
One of the main interpretive difficulties related to the dialogues’ view of the 
value of examples is highlighted by a comment Richard Robinson makes in 
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his treatment of the dialectical method of the early and middle dialogues: 
“The early [period],” he notes, “gives prominence to method but not to 
methodology, while the middle gives prominence to methodology but not 
to method” (1962, 61).3 This shift in emphasis is reflected in the two main 
lines of scholarly interpretation of the methodological significance of exam-
ple in the dialogues: those who focus on Socrates’ argumentative employ-
ment of examples and those who offer readings of the “theory” of example 
articulated by the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman. The former trajectory 
is pursued by scholars engaged in the debate about whether Socrates uses 
examples fallaciously, according to his own principle that examples cannot 
form the basis for a definition (Geach 1966; Santas 1972; Beversluis 1987; 
Vlastos 1990; Prior 1998; Wolfsdorf 2004; Ferejohn 2013). Following the 
latter trajectory are scholars of the later dialogues and of Platonic method-
ology who have provided interpretations of what Melissa Lane describes as 
“the longest and most detailed discussion of example as such [paradeigma], 
or any of its sisters—analogy, image, comparison—in Plato” (1998, 61). 
Many of these scholars identify important similarities between the method 
of example and the dialectician’s method of collection (Goldschmidt 1947; 
Robinson 1962; Bluck and Neal 1975; Kato 1995; Gill 2006; El Murr 2006; 
Sayre 2006; Gill 2012). Nonetheless, none of these scholars has given an 
account for the way examples facilitate such dialectical thinking.
Those focusing on Socrates’ argumentative use of examples have pri-
oritized the persuasive deployment of examples over their value for inquiry, 
thereby neglecting the pedagogical potential of examples to illuminate what 
is not yet known. According to Robinson, the Statesman’s own discussion of 
paradeigma “justifies . . . the use of examples in teaching, not in suggesting 
new propositions to oneself or in proving such propositions. . . . By calling 
the learner’s attention to something he already knows, the teacher causes 
him to know something more” (1962, 211). Even those who have treated 
the pedagogical rather than argumentative purpose of examples have not 
addressed their attendant psychological and affective conditions, which are 
suggested by the educational scene invoked by the Eleatic Stranger in the 
Statesman’s description of the method of example. In the following analysis, 
I take up this underappreciated aspect of the Statesman’s account, arguing 
that examples not only offer a means of argumentative exposition and epis-
temological abstraction but serve the psychagogic role of encouraging the 
learner to desire the intelligible. My account also adds to prior  interpreters’ 
view of example as practice in the method of collection by showing that 
PR 49.3_04_Moore.indd   303 24/06/16   11:59 PM
holly g. moore 
304
example may also serve to inculcate dialectical habits of mind, such as 
abstraction and the desire to discern the intelligible within experience.
the meaning of paradeigma in plato’s dialogues
Before diving into the dialogues’ ambiguous use of paradeigma, it is worth 
considering Aristotle’s explicit discussion of the term in the Rhetoric and in the 
Prior Analytics, since this has received more attention in scholarship on para-
deigma and since his restriction of paradeigma to rhetorical argument seems 
directly related to the metaphysical implications of Plato’s use of the term. In 
his Rhetoric, Aristotle describes paradeigma (regularly translated as “example”) 
as the rhetorical counterpart (antistrophē) of dialectical induction (1356b1–5), 
called upon to corroborate (or, in its absence, substitute for) persuasion through 
enthymematic proof (1394a15–20). Aristotle’s treatment of paradeigma in the 
context of its argumentative use is likely the source of the scholarly limitation 
of examples to their argumentative function. That said, Aristotle provides nei-
ther a purely logical nor unambiguous account of paradeigma.
First of all, Aristotle notes that “the example does not concern the rela-
tion of part to whole [particular to universal], nor of whole to part, but of 
part to part, of like to like” (1932, 14 [1357b28–29]). As I have noted, there 
is scholarly disagreement regarding the meaning of Aristotle’s claim that 
paradeigma moves from part to part, with Benoit arguing that this includes 
an implicit, “mediating generalization” (1987, 262) and Hauser arguing that 
paradeigma can operate as an “argument based on an unmediated inference, 
a recognition” (1985, 179). In spite of this ambiguity, Aristotle does elucidate 
a fundamental relationship between these two “parts”: “When two things 
fall under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other, 
the better-known is the example” (1932, 14 [1357b29–30]). Thus, according to 
Aristotle, a paradeigma (1) is used in rhetorical persuasion in a way similar 
to that of dialectical induction; (2) can support or, when necessary, sub-
stitute for enthymematic proof; (3) involves the generic likeness between 
two instances; and (4) consists of an instance that is more familiar to the 
audience.
Given the scope of the Rhetoric, it is unsurprising that Aristotle’s 
account of paradeigma describes the speaker’s pattern of reasoning. 
However, this emphasis on paradeigma as the tool of the rhetorician leaves 
implicit any account of the way that one comes to know the principle for 
the sake of which the example is given. That is, although Aristotle describes 
paradeigma as the rhetorical correlate to dialectical induction, he does not 
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describe the epistemological or psychological mechanism of this movement 
of thought. This is certainly no failure on Aristotle’s part and instead a 
 feature of the restricted concern of the Rhetoric’s inquiry.
Nonetheless, in the Prior Analytics (69a), where the logic of paradeigma 
is explicitly addressed, Aristotle is careful to distinguish it from epagōgē, or 
(dialectical) induction proper. The likeness of an example to what it exem-
plifies is one that is constructed by the speaker, and, although it may produce 
persuasion regarding something that is true, its likeness to the exemplified is 
not the cause of its truth. Minimizing the dialectical value of paradeigmata 
for discovering the truth of things may well be Aristotle’s way of resist-
ing Plato’s metaphysics of mimesis, which proposes that the likeness of 
examples to forms is nonaccidental. However, eliminating the metaphysical 
association of paradeigma also limits Aristotle’s ability to explain the way 
paradeigma can function as the starting point for inquiry, and as what fol-
lows demonstrates, this is the unique advantage of Plato’s ambiguous use of 
the term.
As Kenneth Sayre notes, the meaning of paradeigma as example, or 
instance of a general type, is common throughout the dialogues: “In the 
Apology, Socrates suggests that the oracle’s pronouncement about none 
surpassing him in wisdom is a matter of singling him out as an exam-
ple (παράδειγμα: 23b1) to illustrate the wisdom of recognizing one’s own 
ignorance. In the Phaedrus, he cites his speeches on Love as providing 
an example (παράδειγμα: 262d1) of how a knowledgeable orator can mis-
lead his audience; in the Philebus, he alludes to examples (παραδείγματα: 
13c8) of pleasures being at odds with one another; and so forth” (2006, 
73). Whether or not Plato’s own view of the proper sense of paradeigma is 
consistent across the dialogues, there is clearly a consistent pattern of use 
of the term to mean an instance of a principle or type. But this invocation 
is by no means limited to an argumentative function, as it seems to be in 
Aristotle’s account. Indeed, the oracle has no need for persuasive argument 
and may use examples as warnings or enticements. In addition, though 
they contain many arguments, the dialogues are by no means purely argu-
mentative. The vast majority of examples there are illustrative rather than 
evidential. Clearly, paradeigma in the dialogues involves more than argu-
ment alone.
In addition to the general sense of “example” as an instance of a type, 
the dialogues also invoke the term “paradeigma” to refer to that of which an 
example is an example. In the first instance noted by Sayre, Socrates would 
appear to stand as an example of what human wisdom looks like, just as 
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Socrates’ speeches on love serve as negative examples of “what not to do” as 
a rhetor. While there are, then, both positive examples (examples given as 
ideals to emulate) and negative examples (examples of what to avoid), the 
“exemplarity” of each implicitly invokes reference to an ideal as the basis of 
its function qua example. Ironically, then, even the negative example refer-
ences the “ideal”—precisely as its negation.
That the exemplarity of an example implies an ideal justifies the dia-
logues’ other usage of paradeigma to describe the forms, which are the 
source of the exemplarity of each of their instances: “I think the most likely 
view is, that these ideas (eidē) exist in nature as patterns (paradeigmata), 
and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them” (1963, 219 
[132d2–3]). Socrates can only be held up as an ideal example of human 
wisdom because of his likeness to the ideal of wisdom. Although the ide-
alization of an example as a model is common, this metaphysical sense 
of paradeigma creates a productive ambiguity in the dialogues.4 As David 
Ambuel puts it, “A paradigm is a model for comparison, but the term is 
ambiguous. . . . A paradeigma might be an architect’s or sculptor’s model, 
an image (eikōn) of what is to be made, but it can also be an exemplar, 
the standard against which other things are measured” (2007, 8). That is, 
 paradeigma operates, on the one hand, by appeal to sensible or particular 
instantiations of universal classes or rules and, on the other hand, by act-
ing as exemplars or proxies for those very rules. As Ambuel notes, this 
sense of the term makes the translation of “paradeigma” as “model” often 
appropriately ambiguous. Samuel McCormick marks this same ambigu-
ity in the Latin “exemplum”, calling it “a strategic resource . . . introducing 
ambiguity into any given rhetorical situation” (2008, 274). In a later section, 
I return to this productive ambiguity when treating the Stranger’s recursive 
 paradeigma of paradeigma.
Although the relationship between the two senses of paradeigma 
(example and exemplar) are in some sense embedded within the structure 
of any example, these different senses need not constitute the grounds of 
an ontological difference. Indeed, Aristotle resists just such dualism by 
limiting his use of paradeigma to the sense of example (or part) alone.5 
Despite this departure from metaphysical paradigmatism, in his account 
of example Aristotle still emphasizes the relation of similarity as funda-
mental to paradeigma. In addition to recognizing the nature of paradeigma 
as similar to others of its kind and to its genus, the Statesman dialogue 
suggests that paradeigma offers access to otherwise unattainable truths. 
Analyzing the discussion of this aspect of paradeigma will provide insight 
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for determining the way that examples serve a psychagogic function in 
dialectical pedagogy.
paradeigma as a means for inquiry and learning 
in the statesman
The Eleatic Stranger’s discussion of paradeigma in the Statesman is simul-
taneously rich and opaque. The discussion begins with two metaphors 
that require careful interpretation. Understanding these as well as the 
pedagogical backdrop they introduce provides the necessary framework 
for  interpreting the psychagogic implications of example described there. 
While most interpretations of this discussion focus on the role of the teach-
er’s cognitive anticipation of the target of dialectical inquiry, my reading 
will focus instead on the way an inquirer may transform the learning of 
new cases into understanding of an abstract principle. I will argue that by 
mirroring the cognitive anticipation of the pedagogue, the learner’s affective 
state of expectation orients the learner’s desire toward finding the intelli-
gible within experience.
The context within which the main speaker of the Statesman, the Eleatic 
Stranger, begins his discussion of paradeigma is inauspicious. Though the 
aim of the conversation is to define the statesman, each attempt made by 
means of the Stranger’s characteristic “method of division” has somehow 
failed.6 Moreover, the Stranger’s attempt to clarify the nature of their dif-
ficulty for his young interlocutor, Socrates, through use of a myth only pro-
duces more confusion.7 At this point, the Stranger stops to reflect on their 
predicament, likening it to two kinds of error in the arts:
In my opinion our figure of the king is not yet perfect, but like 
statue-makers who sometimes in their misapplied enthusiasm make 
too numerous and too large additions and thus delay the completion 
of their several works, we too . . . have taken up a marvelous mass of 
myth and have consequently been obliged to use a greater part of it 
than we should. . . . Our talk, just like a picture of a living creature, 
seems to have good enough outline, but not yet to have received 
the clearness that comes from pigments and the blending of colors. 
And yet it is more fitting to portray any living being by speech and 
argument than by painting or any handicraft whatsoever to persons 
who are able to follow argument; but to others it is better to do it by 
means of works of craftsmanship. (1925, 75–77 [277a5–c7])8
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On the one hand, with the myth, they included too much, the way sculptors 
do when their work becomes busy with figures; on the other hand, with their 
divisions they also included too little, like a painter’s first sketch, which while 
generally accurate lacks the clarity and specificity that comes from layering 
colors.9 This seems to suggest that both illustrations and logical analyses tend 
to inadequately represent the subjects they treat, one by including too many 
particulars and the other by including too few. Illustrations, like sculptures, 
may become overly complicated, thus obscuring the subject; definitions, like 
sketches, are accurate but only because they are lacking details. The Stranger 
seems to prioritize logoi here but recognizes that Young Socrates is unable 
to follow his logical analysis and thus knows the he must instead “paint” him 
a picture of their problem. With this, the Stranger has not only introduced 
the fundamental rhetorical principle that a speech must suit both its subject 
and its audience but has also employed this principle with his use of craft 
comparisons for his inexperienced interlocutor.10
Having suggested that paradeigmata are a resource for those who cannot 
follow logoi, the Stranger immediately makes his claim stronger, saying that 
paradeigmata are indispensible to all who inquire into the “greater things”:
It is difficult, my extraordinary friend, to point out sufficiently any of 
the greater things [tōn meizonōn] unless one makes use of examples 
[paradeigmasi]. For each of us likely knows everything as in a dream 
and again when awake, is unaware of it all.
—How do you mean?
In a very strange way, it seems like I have just now stirred up our 
experience [pathos] regarding knowledge.
—Why is that?
Comrade, my example [paradeigma] itself is again in need of an 
example (paradeigmatos). (1925, 77 [277d1–10])
Given this, it is puzzling that later in his discussion, the Stranger asserts 
that “the greatest and noblest conceptions have no image wrought plainly 
for human vision, which he who wishes to satisfy the mind of the inquirer 
can apply to some one of his senses and by mere exhibition satisfy the 
mind” (1925, 107 [285e5–286a4]). If the most important subjects of inquiry 
cannot be demonstrated through appeal to sensible examples, then why 
on earth are examples essential to exactly such inquiry? To understand 
this, I  contend that we must abandon the notion that examples offer 
 demonstrative evidence and turn instead to the view that they might offer 
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a psychagogic resource. Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with the 
Stranger’s  contention in the Sophist that “everyone has agreed long ago that 
if investigations of great matters (tōn megalōn) are to be properly worked 
out we ought to practice them on small and easier matters before attacking 
the very greatest” (1961, 271–73 [218c7–d2]). Rather than providing a dem-
onstration, practicing with something simple and based on familiar experi-
ence prepares the inquirer to study something less conspicuous.
This emphasis on the way simple examples give us practice in the 
study of greater things accords with Victor Goldschmidt’s identifica-
tion of “exercise” as one of the primary functions of paradeigma in Plato’s 
 dialogues (1985, 15–22). Scholars differ, however, concerning what exactly 
is being practiced by means of paradeigma. Mary Louise Gill argues that 
when an example harbors a structure similar to a more abstract, less famil-
iar target of inquiry, examples become models (2006, 9). Goldschmidt and 
Sayre go further, saying that treating examples as models accomplishes the 
same work as the dialectical method of collection (1985, 15, 18–19; 2006, 90). 
Clearly, then, examples are not simply illustrations but are tools for har-
nessing familiar experience in order to develop understanding of what can 
be “demonstrated by logos alone” (1925, 107 [286a7–8]). But how do examples 
accomplish this?
The Stranger explains that our dependency on examples is caused 
by a fundamental epistemological condition in which “each of us likely 
knows everything as in a dream and again when awake, is unaware of it 
all.” Though what he means is not entirely evident, if we compare this 
statement to his earlier discussion of illustration and analysis, his expla-
nation here becomes clearer. Just as illustration by appeal to sensible 
experience is engrossing and vivid but contains unnecessary and mis-
leading additions, dreams also richly recall reality, and yet once we wake 
up, the dream world disappears. Our awakening to the intelligible has a 
similar character—while we begin to know the shape of things in their 
abstract outline (eidos), we also seem to lose the colorful conviction that 
sensuous, “dreamy” experience provides. On this reading, our “waking” 
state corresponds to our explicit awareness and articulation of what we 
know, while dream knowledge is the inarticulate intuition that forms the 
foundation of our beliefs.
Scholars find support for this interpretation of the Stranger’s dream 
claim based on its similarity to Socrates’ invocation of dreaming in the 
Meno to describe the way that Meno’s slave recollects the answer to the 
problem posed: “And right now, like a dream, these opinions were just 
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aroused in him” (85c1–11; my translation) (Goldschmidt 1947, 53; Robinson 
1962, 214; Bluck and Neal 1975, 36–40; Sayre 2006, 77, 86). However, some 
appropriately express resistance to eliding the Stranger’s remarks with the 
discussion of recollection (Kato 1995, 163, 168; Gill 2006, 6n13). Regardless 
of whether recollection and dreaming can be compared, the Stranger’s 
claim, like Socrates’ in the Meno, clearly privileges the dream state as a 
starting point for knowledge.
However they do it, examples appear to be necessary because they are 
able to ferry us from our dependency on the vividness of our dreamy, sen-
sible experiences to a wakeful recognition of what is common between the 
sensible and the intelligible. Rather than feeling we have lost touch with 
reality, as we often do when engaging in analytic abstraction, examples 
bring us down to earth, demonstrating not the ideas themselves but our 
soul ’s intimate connection to them. Although the senses portray a world of 
things, this world is “all in our mind.” Just like a dream, the truth of sensa-
tion resides in its impact on the soul. By connecting to examples, however, 
we find ourselves drawn to see the forms’ expression in the world, reflected 
in the soul’s sensible affect. Let us turn now to a fuller exposition by consid-
ering the Stranger’s explanation of this “dreamy” knowledge in his appeal to 
the example of children learning their letters.
the paradeigma for paradeigma
When Young Socrates asks the Stranger to explain his claim about the 
dreamlike lens through which we know the world, he receives, as we have 
seen, the following enigmatic response: “Comrade, my paradeigma itself is 
again in need of a paradeigma.” Although this response does not appear to 
address why we need examples in order to investigate the “greater things” 
nor our experience of lacking knowledge when awake, we should expect 
that this recursive claim will eventually address both of these issues. In addi-
tion, it is important to keep in mind the ambiguous usage of  paradeigma 
in Plato’s dialogues, as this provides the basis for my interpretation of the 
passage as well as the grounds for my ultimate claim about the way the 
learner’s affective negotiation of an example can accomplish psychagōgia, 
thereby laying the ethical groundwork for the practice of dialectical inquiry.
Before proceeding, I must first address the paradox of translating the 
Stranger’s recursive claim that his paradeigma is in need of a paradeigma. 
Since the term is ambiguous, it seems necessary to decide which of the 
two senses is being invoked in each position. When faced with this, one is 
PR 49.3_04_Moore.indd   310 24/06/16   11:59 PM
psychagogic work of examples in plato’s statesman
311
forced to translate in light of the explanation of paradeigma, but one can 
only accomplish this if one already knows the meaning of paradeigma as it 
is used in the very phrase in question.11 Indeed, the particular  paradeigma 
the Stranger offers is an instance that not only illustrates the use of 
 paradeigmata for acquiring knowledge of unfamiliar cases but also describes 
how we come to know the paradigmatic as such. Thus, the ability to make 
the distinction between the two senses of paradeigma (as example and as 
exemplar) is itself founded on the movement from a comparative instance 
to an abstract model. As a result, in each use of “paradeigma,” both senses 
of the term are always already in play. Since the paradigm is meant to help 
us, let us consider the Stranger’s own example before proceeding.
To illustrate the way paradeigmata work, the Stranger draws on the 
familiar scenario of children learning their letters (stoikheia). 12 He describes 
the way a teacher helps students to leverage the correct opinions they already 
have so they may acquire correct opinions about new instances and build 
toward a general knowledge of the way each letter functions. According to 
the Stranger, the grammar teacher’s method is this:
Leading them first to those cases in which they had correct opin-
ions about those same letters and then leading them and setting 
them beside the groups which they did not yet recognize and by 
comparing them to showing that their nature is the same in both 
combinations alike, and continuing until the letters about which 
their opinions are correct have been shown in juxtaposition with 
all those of which they are ignorant. Being shown in this way 
 paradeigmata come about [παραδείγματα οὕτω γιγνόμενα] and 
make every letter in all syllables always the same, either by differ-
entiation from the other letters, in case it is different, or because it 
is the same. (1925, 79–81 [278a8–c2])
As Sayre puts it, the premise of the lesson is “a situation in which certain 
letters are easily recognizable by the student in some contexts but not in 
others” (2006, 79). For example, a child just learning to read might recog-
nize the a in “cat” but not necessarily the one in “bath.” By placing the two 
cases together, whether in speech (pronouncing each word in turn) or in 
writing (visually displaying the familiar word alongside the unfamiliar one), 
a teacher asks the student to compare the properties of the a in the known 
example to those of the new case (“paradeigma” literally means “show 
alongside”). The student who succeeds recognizes a sensible similarity—for 
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instance, between the sound of the a in “cat” and the sound of the a in 
“bath” or between the shape of the a in the visual depiction of each word. 
Thus, an example becomes an example when the learner sees its similarity 
to another case, in spite of differences of context. Consequently, knowl-
edge of previously unrecognized instances is acquired through association 
by similarity to previously known instances. On this account, comparisons 
of familiar to unfamiliar cases seem to add to our dream knowledge rather 
than translate the “dream” into a “waking” logos.
In addition to acquiring new instances by assimilation, however, by 
repeating this exercise of recognizing similarities, the pupil begins to appre-
hend a set of typical properties that inhere in every instance of the letter, 
abstracted from the peculiarities of each of its instantiations. That is, exam-
ples give a learner the ability to acquire more and more correct opinions 
about sensible instances as well as a path by which he or she might ascend 
to the principle of the examples’ exemplarity: “Being shown in this way 
paradeigmata come about and bring it about that every letter is in all syl-
lables always [seen to be] the same, either by differentiation from the other 
letters, in case it is different, or because it is the same.” Here, the Stranger is 
clearly trading on the double meaning of “paradeigma”: through this pro-
cess of comparison, examples come to be exemplars. And once they do, we 
see that exemplars are the result of a process of abstraction from examples, 
whereby the example’s similarity to another example is purified of indi-
viduating differences and whereby the abstract features of one exemplar 
are distinguished from those of other exemplars, just as the painter’s sketch 
represents the simplest features of the work. Thus, at the same time that one 
comes to know the general feature of the letter a, which is shared by both 
“cat” and “bath,” one also comes to know that a is different from the other 
elements involved, even those that may not yet be recognizable in their own 
right. That is, part of knowing the abstraction a is knowing that it is not any 
of the other letters.
Given this, how might we understand the way the grammar lesson func-
tions as a paradeigma of paradeigma? Although I find compelling Stanley 
Rosen’s argument that the grammar lesson is provided as a model for how 
examples work and not simply an instance or example of them, I also take 
seriously Shinro Kato’s suggestion that the paradeigma is internally mul-
tiple: “Simple syllables serve as paradeigma . . . for complex syllables. The 
whole process of children’s learning in turn serves as paradeigma . . . for what 
paradeigma itself . . . is, . . . what is regarded as paradeigma for what depends 
upon the context and the observer’s viewpoint” (1995, 169).13 I suggest, in 
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addition, that this number must be doubled, for at each level the paradeigma 
Kato distinguishes is simultaneously serving as both an instance of a model 
and a model for that instance—an example as well as an exemplar. In addi-
tion, as Kato himself notes, the Stranger introduces the paradeigma of chil-
dren learning as an example and model of both our fundamental need for 
paradeigmata as well as of the dreamy basis of our knowledge. Let us now 
return to this primary motivation.
How does this paradeigma of the grammar student clarify the 
Stranger’s original claim that paradeigmata are indispensible to inquiry into 
the “greater things” and that our knowledge is like that of a dream, which 
disappears when we wake? First, the student who learns letters is clearly in 
possession of a correct opinion, namely, that the letter a is in the word “cat”: 
“For could anyone, my friend, who begins with false opinion, ever attain to 
even a small part of truth and acquire wisdom?” (1925, 81 [278d8–e1]). Surely 
not. This access to true opinion in turn explains the Stranger’s characteriza-
tion of our general epistemic state as oneiric in nature:
Can we wonder, then, that our soul, whose nature involves it 
in the same uncertainty about the letters or elements of all things 
[τά τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα], is sometimes in some cases firmly 
grounded in the truth about every detail, and again in other cases 
is all at sea about everything, and somehow or other has correct 
opinions about some combinations, and then again is ignorant of 
the same things when they are transferred to the long and difficult 
syllables of things? (1925, 81 [278c10–d6])
That is, when “awake” to the “long and difficult syllables of things” we 
seem to know nothing at all, even though what we seek is something with 
which we already have a great deal of experience. This is because of a lack of 
familiarity with these “greater things.” Examples, then, provide practice in 
reaching for such things, giving us practical experience with the intelligible, 
which has no inherent affective purchase on our souls.
This indeed appears to be the condition of most of Socrates’ inter-
locutors—take Euthyphro, the seer who when posed with the disarmingly 
simple question “What is piety?” discovers that for all his ability to use 
the word, he seems not to be able to give a satisfactory definition of it. In 
this case, “to hosion” is that “same thing,” which, when treated abstractly, 
appears wholly foreign. For certainly it is foreign to Euthyphro to consider 
the abstract nature of “the pious” itself—his knowledge of piety is based on 
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experience. In this way, one who has extensive experience will have true 
opinions, but these will seem like dreams when “transferred to the long 
and difficult syllables of things,” and their truth evaporates when one tries 
to awaken to such inquiry. This is not because Euthyphro’s true opinions 
are themselves inadequate but because Euthyphro’s soul does not recognize 
that “the pious” (the abstract self-same nature that unifies all the things he 
recognizes as similarly “pious”) already resides within all his true opinions 
about pious things.14 The Stranger seems to be claiming that our  problem 
(and, by extension, Euthyphro’s) is psychological and epistemological 
rather than ontological—that because we do not perceive the stoikheia that 
constitute the truth of our true opinions, we also fail to see the relation-
ship between those opinions and the “greater things.” As a result, when 
we inquire into the “greater things,” we stand in need of some intermedi-
ary, an example that, through comparison with what is already known, can 
produce recognition of the similarity between what is known and what 
is not known. But this similarity must itself be “abstracted” from both of 
the examples in which it resides and through which we come to know 
it. This is how examples, through comparison, “become paradeigmata”—by 
becoming known as the stoikheia on the basis of which we might under-
stand the complex syllables of things as the truth of both the “dream world” 
of our experience and the “waking world” that holds the intelligibility of 
that experience. Similarly, this is how paradeigmata act as both examples 
and exemplars: through the one we may transform our souls so they may 
be seen as the other. Paradeigma is, therefore, in both senses of the term, the 
agent of psychagōgia.
In this way, the Stranger’s paradeigma of paradeigma has indeed 
explained why we are in need of paradeigmata for investigating the “greater 
things” and the way paradeigmata intervene and conduce toward that 
knowledge. However, the Stranger does not explain the precise mechanism 
by which a student may finally recognize not simply the similarity among 
instances but the principle of that similarity, the abstract “structural fea-
tures” (Gill 2006, 5), or stoikheia. That is, how does a student come to grasp 
not merely the many instances of a but the letter (stoikheion) a itself ? How 
does one move from correct opinions about the experiential instances that 
comparisons generate to the intelligible logos that supports both the exem-
plarity of those examples and the correctness of the opinions formed on 
their basis? We need a psychological account for the epistemological transi-
tion from examples to exemplars, not just one from the point of view of the 
teacher but also from the point of view of the learner. That is, we need an 
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account of the animation of a student’s inquiry into an intelligible principle 
based on the similarity among examples. Given the pedagogical context 
of the Stranger’s account, such an explanation is served by assessing the 
affect that accompanies and facilitates this cognitive transition indicative of 
psychagōgia. In my concluding section, then, I develop an account regarding 
the way examples serve such a psychagogic function, producing the condi-
tions for an affective correlate to the method of collection that facilitates 
apprehension of the intelligible within experience.
cultivating the desire for logoi:  
the dialectical ēthos
Clearly, having a skilled guide in the study of grammar is imperative, for in 
the absence of formal training a student will likely never seek to know more 
than what is experienced. That is, the student in the example case is not 
seeking to know something about “the letter a in general,” nor is the student 
likely aware that there is some “greater thing” or more abstract truth to be 
discovered. Until the student is aware that there is something to learn, she or 
he has no motivation to seek after it. Thus, essential to the student’s learning 
is the presence of a teacher who already knows that there is a principle to 
be established and knows how best to harness the student’s true opinions to 
create the opportunity for the student to engage in abstract inquiry.
Kato identifies having an “anticipative grasp” of the exemplarity of the 
selected example as key to the teacher’s role (1995, 163). That is, because 
the teacher already knows the formal property implicitly embedded in the 
example, she or he may choose a fitting example for the comparison: “In so 
far as a paradeigma is grasped as a paradeigma for something, it has to con-
tain, at least implicitly, a logical structure in itself ” (1995, 164). But how is 
this principle, or logos, which is embedded within the instance, recognized 
as such by the learner? How do we recognize the basis for these similarities 
and thereby ascend to the abstract principle of the example? The answer, 
I believe, rests in an enlivened state of a learner’s soul, which stands as the 
correlative to the “anticipative grasp” of the teacher.
One can see similarities only if one is looking for them, and this tends 
to happen only if one has been encouraged to look in the first place. 
Borrowing Socrates’ reasoning that until we know we are ignorant we have 
no motive to seek after knowledge, we can say that a student likewise must 
first believe that there is a similarity to be discovered before seeking and 
finding it. By simply presenting the two cases together, a teacher creates 
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the possibility for the student to desire to discover the relationship that is 
already presupposed by the context of the comparison. In this way, a learner 
mimics the cognitive “anticipative grasp” of the teacher through an affec-
tive expectation that she or he will find similarities. Thus, the teacher pre-
pares the learner for inquiry by guiding the learner’s expectation. The pupil’s 
expectation is thus a psychic condition that prepares the way for noetic 
ascent toward the principle that grounds the similarity of the example.
The movement from the true opinion that characterizes our dreamy 
understanding to knowledge of its intelligible cause depends on the soul 
being drawn to find the similarity that grounds the paradeigma as exemplary. 
Inspiring such a desire is the psychagogic aim of the pedagogue, and exam-
ples are, in this case, the means through which the soul is thus led. Therefore, 
the exercise that examples provide is not just one of recognizing similari-
ties but also of seeking the principle of the intelligibility of what is already 
known. Because of their ability to motivate inquiry, examples can also serve 
to cultivate a dialectical ēthos oriented by the desire to know the intelligible 
embedded within experience and to become accurate “dream interpreters.”
I maintain that such an affective orientation is a prerequisite to engaging 
in the dialectical methods of collection and division. For one cannot seek to 
know the exemplarity of an example, what makes “every letter in all syllables 
always the same,” if one does not expect to find it. Though it is a sort of mim-
ing of the dialectician’s desire for the logoi of things, this affective expectation 
produces a psychological state conducive to apprehending the abstraction 
that reveals the principle of an example’s exemplarity. Although dialectical 
inquiry itself proceeds by reasoning, it requires a prior and ongoing desire to 
know “the greater things.” Thus, although the Stranger makes it clear that 
paradeigmata help us to acquire understanding of novel instances by means of 
our true opinions, no amount of reasoning could draw us toward the exem-
plarity of each example were it not for the pedagogical context within which 
paradeigmata are presented as worthy of consideration. The  presentation of 
the example as an example is the occasion for a psychagōgia, where, by expect-
ing to find similarities between the example and novel cases, one may also 
begin to desire knowledge of the principles that ground true opinions.
benefits, limitations, and consequences of reading 
example as psychagogic
There are a few important advantages to this reading of the way examples 
contribute to dialectical inquiry. First, it provides additional evidence that 
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examples, as well as other “aesthetic” appeals, are not antithetical to  dialectical 
inquiry but instead make possible the psychic disposition prerequisite to dia-
lectical inquiry. Second, this view of the propaedeutic function of examples in 
the ascent from true opinion to knowledge offers an affective correlate to the 
cognitive preparation ascribed to the study of mathematics in book 7 of the 
Republic. Finally, by exposing the psychagogic work of examples, this reading 
explains the Stranger’s otherwise confusing claim that while the most impor-
tant subjects are best investigated by means of logoi, examples are indispensi-
ble for such inquiry. In sum, although examples have primarily been regarded 
by some scholars of the Statesman as cognitive training in the method of col-
lection, I assert that their primary function is to prepare the affective nature 
of the inquirer for dialectical study by inspiring a desire to find the intelligible 
cause of the similarity between a familiar and unfamiliar case.
Although the Stranger claims paradeigmata are indispensible to inquiry 
into the “greater things,” this does not mean that they are foolproof. As 
with arguments by analogy, inquiry through example has limitations. First, 
the selection of a suitable example is left to the teacher to determine. The 
virtue of a teacher resides in understanding the nature of what is being 
exemplified as well as in recognizing what experiences are in fact familiar 
to the student. Similarly, a teacher might choose an apt example but not 
be able to motivate the student to consider the salient similarity, or, given a 
recognition of the similarity, the student may not wish to understand what 
the teacher is doing and thus fail to mimic in affect the teacher’s cognitive 
grasp. Neither the example nor the teacher can independently stimulate 
the desire to mimic the teacher’s understanding; they can only create that 
opportunity. Finally, examples are not themselves a “dialectical” practice but 
rather an occasion for developing the dialectical temperament and desire 
for finding the intelligible basis for the truth of one’s experience. That is, 
examples may serve as practice at the dialectical method of collection but 
there is no reason to assert, as Sayre does, that they replace it (2006, 74).
I have argued that on the account of the Statesman, examples serve a 
psychagogic function by offering an opportunity for practicing abstraction 
in preparation for the dialectical method of collection and for developing a 
desire to know the intelligible principles of our experiential understanding, 
thereby cultivating the affective ēthos of the dialectician. This thesis is not 
a complement to the argumentative treatment of example in Plato’s work 
but rather a challenge to the view that the logical form of argument is sepa-
rable from its psychological conditions. This study demonstrates, instead, 
the interrelatedness of the learner’s affective and cognitive negotiation 
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of examples. By integrating more explicitly the dialogues’ discussions of 
 pedagogy with those of methodology, my work complements Mitchell 
Miller’s (2004) view of the Statesman as not simply a text that concerns 
political theory and philosophical methodology but also at its heart one 
that concerns philosophical pedagogy. In addition to developing an inter-
pretation that integrates the rhetorical and philosophical aspects of the 
Statesman’s treatment of paradeigma, by attending to its pedagogical frame, 
my argument reveals that contrary to Aristotle’s own view of example, the 
Statesman privileges paradeigma as a means for producing psychagōgia and 
nurturing a dialectical disposition. Thus, even if the godlike dialectician 
(Phaedrus 266b) might have no need for examples in an independent pur-
suit of the “greater things,” the true statesman, who must tend to the rearing 
and education of citizens, is bound to employ paradeigmata to awaken the 
dreamer to a desire for the knowledge of the logoi of experience. The psy-
chagogic work of example, then, is a key feature of philosophical pedagogy 




1. I quote from Fowler’s translation throughout with slight modifications. This 
 character from the Greek colony of Elea has traditionally been treated as a mouthpiece for 
Plato’s views late in his career, but there are reasons to be wary of this assumption. First, 
though the Stranger is introduced as “divine” and a “philosopher” (216c1–2), the Stranger’s 
method of division meets with difficulty in both the Sophist and Statesman. Secondly, 
the Stranger cannot simply be considered a substitute for Socrates, since in the Sophist 
his method of division is contrasted with Socratic elenchus, division being described as 
“value-free” (Dorter 1994, 174). That said, the Stranger’s views are clearly significant enough 
to warrant extended demonstration and discussion, and his methodological discussions 
obviously shed light on the two forms of dialectical reasoning that Socrates identifies in 
the Phaedrus—collection and division (266b6–7).
2. The relation of dialektikē to philosophical inquiry in Plato’s dialogues is of consid-
erable importance and yet remains somewhat unclear. The verb “dialegesthai” is regularly 
found in the dialogues and refers to discussion and the exchange of logoi; thus, dialektikē 
is fundamentally the art of logoi. This definition immediately suggests the need to distin-
guish dialectic from rhetoric—a difficulty that animates several dialogues. In the Phaedrus, 
dialectic comes to be identified with the use of the methods of collection and division 
(see note 1).
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3. While one might defend or reject the “developmental” interpretation that insists 
on a strict distinction between the methods of the various periods of the dialogues’ com-
position, it is clear that methods of all kinds are both practiced as well as theorized across 
them, making a firm assessment of the “Platonic” view of any method, whether rhetori-
cal, literary, or philosophical quite difficult. For this reason, my interpretation is limited 
to a reading of the only explicit methodological discussion of example in the dialogues 
(that of the Statesman), although I find it useful to consult related discussions from other 
dialogues that evince similar epistemological and pedagogical concerns as those of the 
Statesman.
4. Victor Goldschmidt cites Georges Rodier as the first to articulate the metaphysi-
cal paradox of paradeigma: “Si les Idées sont les paradigmes des choses sensibles, les choses 
sensibles sont, à leur tour, les paradigmes des Idées” (1985, 7n1).
5. Edward Halper (2006) argues that far from disappearing, the metaphysical sense 
of paradeigma as exemplar occupies an important role in the first book of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics.
6. There is scholarly debate regarding Plato’s own view of the method of divi-
sion (Dorter 1987; De Chiara-Quenzer 1998; Lane 1998; Dorter 1999; Miller 2004). Its 
general form, as practiced in both the Sophist and Statesman, is this: a general class is 
posited and subsequently divided into sub classes, one of which is again divided, and so 
forth, until the target class is “trapped” within the net of divisions, its genus and species 
identified.
7. The Eleatic Stranger’s young interlocutor is not the famous Socrates, who is also 
in attendance, but his “look-alike” in name only. The concern with mistakes made based 
on the similarity of names is a thematic issue throughout the dialogue and seems to be a 
specification of the worries from the prior day’s conversation in the Sophist dialogue about 
the way even opposite things can appear similar (see 231a5–6).
8. The Stranger seems to endorse the notion that a king (βασιλευς) is the ideal 
 political leader (πολιτικος).
9. The ability to recognize the mean (meson) will ultimately constitute a definitive 
skill of the statesman, but, we find here that this skill also characterizes the dialectician’s 
ability to define the statesman. This weaving of the identity of the dialectician and the 
statesman becomes more explicit in the discussion of the interweaving of the methods of 
collection and division (285a9–b8).
10. Jacob Klein examines the relation of this dramatic performance to the “demon-
stration” of the statesman that is sought (1977, 163–66).
11. This is the same problem Jacques Derrida identifies as the “pharmakon” in his 
interpretation of Plato’s Phaedrus in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1981).
12. The ambiguity of the term “stoikheion” is also rich. Having the generic sense of 
“element,” in the context of grammatikē, it refers to an element of language and thus not 
simply written letters but also spoken minima. On this ambivalence, see Ryle 1960. On the 
etymology of “stoikheion,” see Burkert 1959.
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13. Rosen argues that in the Stranger’s formulation, the meaning of paradeigma shifts 
from its first invocation to the second: “A model of this kind exhibits what it is to be an 
example, and that is to say it shows how the example exhibits the general structure of a 
set of instances of the same kind” (2009, 84). Although this is an accurate rendering of 
what the paradeigma of paradeigma accomplishes, I contend that the recursive logic of 
this phrase cannot not be resolved by translating paradeigma first as “example” and then 
as “exemplar.” For, by resolving the equivocity of the term, Rosen obscures the necessary 
relationship between the two senses of paradeigma, which, as I have argued is the main 
engine of the discussion.
14. This is not to say that all Euthyphro’s opinions about what is pious are true—
indeed, identifying those opinions of Euthyphro’s that are true occupies the majority of 
Socrates’ questioning.
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